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Summary
This report discusses Azerbaijan’s democratization progress as evidenced by its
November 6, 2005, legislative election.  It describes the campaign and results and
examines  implications of this election for Azerbaijani and U.S. interests.  This report
will not be updated.  Related reports include CRS Issue Brief IB95024, Armenia,
Azerbaijan, and Georgia, by Jim Nichol.
Background
Since becoming independent in 1991, Azerbaijan has made limited progress toward
democratization, according to many international observers.1  These observers have
viewed Azerbaijan’s previous legislative election in 2000 and presidential election in
2003 as not free and fair, and have criticized human rights abuses that were committed
after the latter race when the government forcibly broke up demonstrations and arrested
many opposition party leaders.  These observers — including international organizations
such as the Council of Europe (COE) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe (OSCE), and countries such as the United States — have cautioned the
Azerbaijani government that the conduct of the November 2005 legislative election would
be taken into account in future relations.2
Under constitutional amendments approved in 2002, future deputies of a 125-
member Milli Mejlis (legislature) would be elected by single member districts for five-
year terms.  Corresponding changes to the election law were approved by  the Azerbaijani
legislature in June 2005, some in line with proposals from the Venice Commission of the
COE.  These included making it easier for people to become candidates.  However, the
sitting deputies rejected some of the most significant proposals, including a more
CRS-2
3 COE.  European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission).  Final
Opinion on the Amendments to the Election Code of the Republic of Azerbaijan by the Venice
Commission and OSCE/ODIHR, Oct. 22, 2005, CDL-AD(2005)029.
4 The Central Electoral Commission reported that about one quarter of the candidates dropped
out or were removed from the ballot.  According to some reports, local government officials
forced some opposition candidates to drop out so that a favored candidate might win.  Also,
where several NAP candidates were running in a district (each backed by competing intra-party
factions), some were ordered to drop out.
5 OSCE.  Election Observation Mission, Republic of Azerbaijan, Parliamentary Elections 2005:
Interim Report, No. 3, Oct. 8 - Oct. 21, 2005.
equitable representation of political interests on electoral commissions, marking hands
to reduce multiple voting, and allowing the many NGOs that receive foreign funding to
monitor elections.  The Venice Commission warned that without these proposed changes,
“public confidence in the electoral legislation and practice” would remain “insufficient.”3
The Campaign
The more equitable and efficient process for registering as a candidate resulted in
some 2,062 people being permitted to run, of which about 17% were opposition party
members, 21% were members of the ruling Yeni Azerbaijan Party (NAP), and over 50%
were independents or undeclared.4  Many independent candidates stated during
campaigning that they were pro-government if not pro-NAP.  The major opposition
parties formed two blocs to try to avoid competing among themselves in individual
districts.  These were the New Policy bloc (Yeni Siyasat or YeS, composed mainly of the
National Independence Party), and the Freedom bloc (Azadliq, composed mainly of the
Musavat, Popular Front, and Democratic parties).  The opposition Liberal Party (ALP)
also fielded candidates in over 60 constituencies.  Providing extra emphasis on a free and
fair race, President Ilham Aliyev issued decrees in May and October 2005 calling on
central and local officials to obey the electoral laws or face prosecution or dismissal.  The
October decree also called for implementing some procedures advocated by the Venice
Commission, in particular inking voters’ fingers, permitting NGOs that receive some
foreign funding to monitor the race, and investigating and resolving electoral irregularities
quickly.
Following President Aliyev’s May 2005 decree, opposition candidates were less
subject to harassment and sometimes were given permission to hold public rallies (after
a two-year ban).  Some access to media was provided by law, but beyond that, public and
ostensibly private media generally were biased against opposition candidates, according
to the OSCE.  Opposition campaign materials sometimes were confiscated by local police.
Although several large opposition rallies were permitted in Baku and some other cities,
unauthorized rallies were suppressed. 5  The most sensational event of the campaign was
the failed attempt by Rasul Guliyev (the head of the Democratic Party, who had been
residing in the United States for several years) to return to Baku on October 17.  He had
been permitted by the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) to register as a candidate, but
the Prosecutor General’s Office immediately stated that he would not enjoy immunity
from arrest if he returned, since embezzlement charges were pending against him.  Three
days after his failed return (his plane reportedly was refused landing rights), the
government announced that it had arrested several officials on charges of conspiracy with
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Guliyev to “create confrontation, stage riots and seize power by force....  Weapons,
ammunition and explosive devices and substances were found and seized in different
parts of the capital.”6  Among the dozens of arrests or detentions were Economic
Development Minister Farhad Aliyev, Health Minister Ali Insanov, presidential advisor
Akif Muradverdiyev, former Finance Minister Fikrat Yusifov, and former Academy of
Sciences head Eldar Salayev.7
Results
The Central Electoral Commission (CEC) reported on the night of the election that
there were few voting irregularities, and the next day announced that the NAP had won
a slim majority of seats in the 125-seat legislature, while opposition parties had garnered
six seats (with the rest won by independent candidates).  Turnout was reported at 46.8%
of 4.6 million voters.  About 40% of incumbents were re-elected.  While arguing that the
election was “free and democratic,” President Aliyev early on November 7 ordered the
investigation of the few reported irregularities.  
A much harsher preliminary assessment was provided later that day by the
International Election Observation Mission (IEOM).8  It reported that the progressive
elements of the election (such as candidate registration) had been undermined by
government interference in campaigning, media bias favoring pro-government candidates,
and significant deficiencies in tabulating results.9  An exit poll funded by the U.S. Agency
for International Development added to concerns when it seemed to indicate
discrepancies between official election tallies and exit poll results in some constituencies.
Perhaps in response to international and opposition party concerns and Aliyev’s
November 7 order, the CEC appeared to reconsider its earlier stance and announced over
the next few days that new elections would be held in four districts and that some recounts
would take place in other districts.  On November 23, the CEC submitted election results
to the Constitutional Court for certification.  The four opposition members of the 15-
person CEC voted not to accept the final vote tally.  According to the tally, the ruling
NAP won 58 seats and the opposition won ten seats, with the remainder won by
independents.
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Implications for Azerbaijan
Some observers argue that President Aliyev is committed to democratization, as
evidenced by his May and October decrees and his post-election dismissals of several
regional and district leaders on charges of interfering in the race.  They view Aliyev’s pre-
election purge of his administration as increasing his appeal among the electorate that he
backs reforms, and as boosting votes for the ruling and other pro-government parties.  At
the same time, these observers assert that the small number of seats the opposition parties
won demonstrates that these parties have failed to gain people’s trust.  Because the
opposition lacks a charismatic leader who could mobilize discontent, opposition forces
will not be able to mount a “revolution” to overturn the government (as such forces did
in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan following elections viewed by many in those
countries as fraudulent).  These analysts also appear confident that the government’s
police and other security agencies are strongly committed to suppress a revolution.10
Aliyev’s October purge alternatively might also be viewed as eliminating many of
his political opponents (some of whom may have been Guliyev’s supporters). In this view,
the purge and the alleged electoral irregularities mark the government’s efforts to suppress
political opposition rather than to advance democratization.11  Other observers argue that
the opposition parties may become stronger and more unified.  The cooperation of the
opposition parties in holding “non-stop protests” in coming days could convince more
people that the government is illegitimate, and sooner or later contribute to defections
from security agencies and a successful revolution, they suggest.12
The main opposition parties continue to pledge to “remain within the law” in
protesting the election, and officials in Baku have given approval for several opposition
rallies.  Along with honest efforts to address electoral regularities, such cooperation could
nurture civil society and greater respect for the sitting government and the rule of law.
A violent police crackdown on peaceful demonstrators on November 24 has raised
concerns among many observers that political instability may increase.
While raising concerns about the election, most international organizations and
countries have not endorsed calls by some Azerbaijani oppositionists for a new election,
but rather have urged investigating irregularities (and possibly holding some new
constituency contests) and punishing guilty officials.  They also have indicated that they
seek continued engagement with Azerbaijan to encourage it to democratize, rather than
economic or other sanctions against the government.  This approach was adopted by
NATO’s Special Representative for the Caucasus and Central Asia, Robert Simmons,
who visited Azerbaijan in mid-November and urged it to increase its cooperation with the
Alliance.  A statement issued by Turkey on November 9 reflected another common
international concern, by urging Azerbaijan’s government to rectify electoral irregularities
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so that “democracy and stability” are strengthened in the country.  Possible sanctions had
been mentioned by the COE in June 2005, when it warned Azerbaijan that its membership
status might come under review if the (then upcoming) election was deeply flawed.13  The
final IEOM election report is due in January 2006, at which time the COE may consider
whether sanctions are called for.
Implications for U.S. Interests
The Administration has been cautious in responding to the Azerbaijani election, as
it waits to see how electoral irregularities are addressed.  Indicating the importance the
United States places on democratization in Azerbaijan, Under Secretary of State Paula
Dobriansky stressed during her July 2005 visit there that free and fair elections would
contribute to “a genuine [U.S.-Azerbaijan] partnership based on shared values as well as
common interests.”  A State Department newsletter likewise stressed democratization in
Azerbaijan as a “core U.S. interest.”14  
This interest in democratization has been balanced by other important U.S. national
interests, including “strong bilateral security and counter-terrorism cooperation, the
advancement of U.S. energy security, progress in free-market and democratic reforms, and
mediation of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict.”  Also, the participation of U.S. firms in
developing Azerbaijan’s energy sector “is key to our objectives of diversifying world oil
supplies,” and helping the country improve its economy.  Azerbaijan has supported the
Global War on Terrorism by sending some troops to Iraq and by offering “crucial law
enforcement and intelligence cooperation, blanket overflight rights, and the possible use
of bases.”15 
U.S. officials and observers differed somewhat in their assessments of the outcome
of the election — with some viewing it as seriously flawed and others as partially or
substantially progressive — and in their policy prescriptions for bilateral ties.  State
Department spokesman Adam Ereli on November 7, 2005, endorsed the preliminary
conclusions reached by the IEOM that “there were major irregularities and fraud [during
the election] that are of serious concern.” At the same time, however, he also appeared to
reassure the Azerbaijani government that the United States would not “at this point make
any specific linkages to what happened in this ... election,” to apparently  higher U.S.
strategic concerns about “issues that we need to deal with Azerbaijan on — energy,
security, [and] counterterrorism,” and other “economic, political, regional, [and]
multilateral” issues.  He also stressed that U.S. criticism was not a “wholesale
indictment,” but a call “to investigate specific allegations.”  The next day, he stated that
the United States was “pleased” that such investigations were underway.16  On November
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28, Ereli strongly condemned a harsh police crackdown on peaceful demonstrators four
days earlier, but also praised the government’s actions to redress electoral irregularities
and stated that the United States would see how such actions played out before making
a final judgment on the electoral process.  The Administration generally has argued that
even when governments falter in democratizing, aid to support local NGOs and other civil
society initiatives should continue.
A different policy response was suggested by the Washington Post, which welcomed
President Aliyev’s “modest” efforts to rectify electoral irregularities and suggested that
the United States should continue engagement with Azerbaijan on a number of strategic
issues.  It also argued, however, that the U.S. Administration should not “reward”
Azerbaijan for the “flawed” race with closer ties.  
Taking a more negative view of the election, the International Crisis Group in late
November urged the Administration to ban visits by Azerbaijani officials to the United
States if they failed to redress election violations.  The NGO stressed that the
Administration should not subordinate its interests in democratization in Azerbaijan to
other strategic goals.  Analyst Vladimir Socor provided a more upbeat assessment that the
election marked a substantial commitment by the Azerbaijani government to
democratization and justified closer U.S.-Azerbaijani ties.  He and others argued that the
scope of electoral irregularities did not appear large enough to fundamentally change the
preference of most voters for NAP and pro-government candidates.17
Congressional Concerns.  Many in Congress have raised concerns about the
status of democratization and respect for human rights in Azerbaijan.  These Members
have argued that a more democratic Azerbaijan would be more supportive of U.S. policy
and would help to stabilize the South Caucasus region, including by reaching a peaceful
settlement of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict.  Reflecting these concerns, the House
approved H.Res. 326 (Gallegly) on July 20, 2005, which called for a free and fair
legislative race in Azerbaijan.  Similar legislation, S.Res. 260 (Biden), was introduced on
September 29, 2005 (an earlier version, S.Res. 226, had been introduced on July 29), and
was approved in the Senate on October 20, 2005.18  Also reflecting Member concern,
Representative Alcee Hastings (who currently chairs the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly)
served as the coordinator of the IEOM.  Congressional assessments of the results may
influence the consideration of future foreign and military assistance and other U.S. ties
with Azerbaijan.
